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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal of an order of the Second Judicial District Court in a civil case
denying a motion to compel arbitration. Denial of a motion to compel arbitration is appealable under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-129. This Court's jurisdiction is also based
upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In a wrongful death action brought by the surviving spouse, did the trial court err
by refusing to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement entered into by the decedent and his physician? (R. 6-19.) "A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration presents a question of law which we review for correctness." Docutel Olivetti Corp.
v. Dick Brady Sys.y Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986).
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES

In 2004, the Legislature amended UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-17, which relates to
arbitration agreements in malpractice actions against health care providers, by inserting
the following provision:
(1)
After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be validly executed or, if the
requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least
one occasion, renewed:
(vii)

the agreement only apply to:

(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement
was signed, provided that the agreement may allow a person who
would be a proper party in court to participate in an arbitration proceeding;
(B)

the claim of:

(I)

a person who signed the agreement;

(II)

a person on whose behalf the agreement was
signed under Subsection (6); and

(III)

the unborn child of the person described in this
Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from
the date the agreement is signed; and

(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract
if the sole basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B).
2004 Utah Laws ch. 84 § 1. Based upon the Governor's signature, the effective date of
the amendment was April 29, 2004. The act provides, however, in § 2, that "[t]his bill
applies to an action for which a court of competent jurisdiction has not issued an order as
of the effective date of this bill certifying the action as a class action in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23."
STATEMENT O F T H E C A S E
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This is an appeal in a civil case from a final order of the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County, Utah denying a motion to compel arbitration, entered April 6,
2006. (R. 164.) Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on May 5, 2006. (R. 178.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The decedent, Mark Bybee, committed suicide on February 20, 2004. (R. 1.)
Mrs. Bybee asserted in her Complaint that Mr. Bybee died as a result of alleged medical
negligence in Dr. Abdulla's treatment of Mr. Bybee for depression. (R. 1.) On May 23,
2003, prior to receiving medical care from Dr. Abdulla, Mr. Bybee signed a document
entitled "Arbitration Agreement." (R. 38.) The Arbitration Agreement signed by Mr.
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Bybee provides that anyone making any claims as a result of the care he received, including claims for wrongful death, would be required to arbitrate their claims. The agreement
provides in pertinent part:
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding
arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and
losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been
rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of
any of them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be
arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of
consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages. . . .
We expressly intend this Agreement shall bind all persons whose
claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which
should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement,
including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born
or unborn at the time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Patient").
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies in a court of
law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act.
*

*

*

Article 7: Read and Understood: I (Patient or Patient's representative )
have read and I understand the above Agreement which has been verbally
explained to me to my satisfaction. I understand that I have the right to
have my questions about arbitration answered and I do not have any unanswered questions. I execute this agreement of my own free will and not
under any duress, and I understand that my signing this agreement is not a
requirement in order to receive medical services from Physician.
(R. 38 (emphasis added).) A copy of the Arbitration Agreement is included in the Appendix. The Arbitration Agreement signed by Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla complies with
all requirements found in both UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-17 and §§ 78-31a-101, et seq.,
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including all of the newly codified requirements found in the 2004 amendment to the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower court refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against Mrs. Bybee,
reasoning that Mrs. Bybee could not be forced to arbitrate her wrongful death claims because she did not sign the agreement. As this Court recognized in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), however, Mr. Bybee was the master of his own
claim and he held the right to determine the forum for any claim arising out of his patient-physician relationship with Dr. Abdulla.
Mr. Bybee could have affected his claim in much more significant ways than simply choosing the forum for any claim he or his heirs might bring. He could have permanently impaired or settled any claim he or his heirs may have had against Dr. Abdulla,
binding Mrs. Bybee and his heirs. Because Mr. Bybee could have forever impaired any
claim he or his heirs could bring, he likewise was free to affect to a lesser degree any
claim he or his heirs could bring by, for example, pre-selecting the forum through use of
an arbitration agreement.
Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla expressly intended that Mr. Bybee's heirs, including
Mrs. Bybee, would be bound by the agreement. Dr. Abdulla, therefore, is entitled to require Mrs. Bybee to arbitrate her wrongful death claims which are specifically derivative
of any claims Mr. Bybee could have brought against Dr. Abdulla had he survived. This
is a question affecting not only the integrity of the contractual basis for the relationship
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between physician and patient, but also the patient's rights of privacy and selfdetermination.
Although the trial court placed great emphasis on whether the 2003 or 2004 version of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applied, the arbitration agreement is binding on Mrs. Bybee and Mr. Bybee's heirs because the amendment simply clarified prior
law concerning when medical arbitration agreements bind heirs of the patient.
Mrs. Bybee is also bound by the Arbitration Agreement because of her position as
an express third-party beneficiary of the agreement.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DECEDENT, AS THE MASTER OF HIS OWN MEDICAL
RELATIONSHIPS AND POTENTIAL CLAIM, WAS FREE TO
STRUCTURE THAT RELATIONSHIP AND POTENTIAL
CLAIM SUCH THAT HIS HEIRS ARE BOUND BY HIS DECISION.

The lower court reasoned that Mrs. Bybee was not bound by the Arbitration
Agreement because she did not sign it and no rule of law or statute existed at the time the
agreement was signed that bound her to arbitrate her wrongful death claims against Dr.
Abduila. (R. 171.) This Court, however, has previously established that heirs bringing
wrongful death claims are subject to the actions of the decedent, even actions that could
impair or even bar the heirs' claims.
In Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), the decedent allegedly
died as a result of medical malpractice committed four years before her death. Prior to
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her death, neither she nor those acting on her behalf had filed an action for medical negligence, and the trial court ruled that the two-year statute of limitations barred the claim.
The heirs appealed, arguing that the wrongful death was a separate wrong that accrued to
them, not the decedent, and that the decedent's failure to pursue her claim was therefore
not binding on them. This Court rejected their argument, holding that the decedent was
the master of her own claim. "[T]he wrongful death cause of action is based on the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to at least some of the
defenses that would have been available against the decedent had she lived to maintain
her own action." 944 P.2d at 332.
As one of the foremost authorities on the law of torts has observed,
the rationale underlying the rule barring the heirs from bringing a wrongful
death suit after the injured patient has brought suit on the underlying personal injury action is that "the injured individual is not merely a conduit for
the support of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though others may
be dependent upon him."
Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton et al, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127,
at 955 (5th ed. 1984)).
Applying the rule of Jensen to the case at bar, Mr. Bybee was master of the terms
of his professional relationship with Dr. Abdulla, including the terms for resolution of
any dispute. Arbitration clauses often affect the substantive terms of the relationship itself, including the willingness of one or both parties to enter into the relationship. Be-

1

Although Ms. Hipwell was in a coma from nearly the date of injury until her death in
May 1992, she was represented by various sets of counsel who allowed the statute of
limitations to run on her medical malpractice claim.
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cause Mr. Bybee was master of his own affairs, his actions during his lifetime are binding
on his heirs in attempting to recover based upon the treatment rendered pursuant to the
agreement he signed.
The trial court, however, without any discussion of this Court's holding in Jensen,
rejected Mr. Bybee's Arbitration Agreement and thereby rejected his right to be the master of his own health, life, privacy, and any claim arising out of his physician-patient relationship with Dr. Abdulla. The trial court erroneously found that because Mrs. Bybee
had not signed the Arbitration Agreement, she could not be bound by it even though the
claim she seeks to assert arises out of the relationship created by that agreement.
II.

THE CLAIMS OF HEIRS ARE SUBJECT TO DEFENSES
WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN ASSERTED AGAINST THE DECEDENT.

According to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, Mr. Bybee "expressly intended] that th[e] Arbitration Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries
and losses arise out of medical care rendered [by Dr. Abdulla] . . . including any spouse
or heirs of [Mr. Bybee] .. .." (R. 38.) Mr. Bybee also expressly intended that all "claims
for personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress, and punitive
damages" would be subject to arbitration. Id.
As a general rule, the heirs of a decedent are bound by the contracts of the decedent. The most obvious example of this is a release of all claims by the decedent prior to
death. As this Court noted in Jensen, the "majority of states refuses to allow a decedent's
heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit after the decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a judgment before dying." 944 P.2d at 332; see also
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Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50 f 14, 94 P.3d 915 (quoting the above phrase and asserting
that the Jensen court agreed with the majority of the states that a decedent may win, lose,
or settle his case before dying); Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 748,
757, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 182 (1993) ("[t]he decedent's express release of any
negligence liability on the part of Paralift binds his heirs in this action and provides
Paralift with a complete defense"); Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895
(D. Colo. 1998) ("if [the deceased] would have been barred from suing Vail because of
the release, his parents will be barred from asserting their wrongful death claim under the
above authority"); Kulling v. Grinders for Industry, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 828, 852 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (spouse bound by release of claims found in her deceased spouse's employment separation agreement).
Mr. Bybee, therefore, had the ability to deny his heirs of any recovery by allowing
the statute of limitations to run or to bind his heirs to a settlement disposing of any claim
the heirs could bring. Indeed, if an injured person could not bind his heirs by contract,
every settlement agreement, stipulation, and any other agreement that could adversely affect how, when, or where an action is brought, maintained, or adjudicated would be invalidated upon the death of the injured person.
Consistent with that line of cases, Utah courts hold that heirs are bound by the
agreements of the decedents from whom the claim is derived. For example, in Russ v.
Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals
ruled that a hold harmless agreement signed by the decedent was clear and unequivocal
and prevented the heirs from bringing wrongful death and negligence claims. 905 P.2d at
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906. Accord, In re Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1982) (estate bound by
contract of decedent).
Similarly, in Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the heirs in a wrongful death action are subject to decedent's
contributory negligence. Id. at 1155. Kelson involved the death of Kelson's son in a
high-speed chase with police. Kelson brought a wrongful death claim against the police
and a jury was permitted to apportion fault among the parties. Kelson was apportioned
seventy-five percent of the fault and received no judgment. The Kelson court acknowledged that "the heirs have 'a right to proceed against the wrongdoer subject to the defenses available against the deceased, had he [or she] lived and prosecuted the suit.'" Id.
at 1154 (quoting Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303-04 (1947),
modified on other grounds, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701 (1948)).
Courts in other jurisdictions also agree that the heirs are subject to the contracts of
the decedent in wrongful death actions, including arbitration agreements.

2

See Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379-80 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), cert, denied,
540 U.S. 1212 (2004) (wife claiming wrongful death bound by husband's arbitration
agreement with HMO, however, arbitration agreement not enforceable due to failure to
comply with health care act requirements in obtaining the agreement); Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, 119 Mich. App. 814, 327 N.W.2d 370 (1982) (personal representative bound by decedent's arbitration agreement in wrongful death action); Jansen v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 NJ. Super. 254, 776 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 2001) (heirs
bound by decedent's contract that included arbitration clause in negligence action against
stock broker); Smith, Barney, Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722 (Miss. 2001) (wrongful
conversion claim by heirs subject to arbitration clause in broker agreement); Collins v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 561 So.2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(same); American Bureau of Shipping v. Tenacara Shipyard, 170 F.3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999)
(non-signatory insurance underwriter compelled to arbitrate); Seborowski v. Pittsburgh
Press Co., 188 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 1999) breach of collective bargaining agreement claims
-9-

This Court should honor and enforce Mr. Bybee's right and intent to commit all
claims arising out of his patient-physician relationship and agreement with Dr. Abdulla to
arbitration. Wrongful death claimants have no right to excuse themselves from a hold
harmless agreement signed by the decedent, to excuse themselves from a settlement
agreement signed by the decedent, to excuse themselves from the decedent's failure to
timely prosecute his claims, to excuse themselves from a decedent's contributorily negligent conduct, or, as in this case, to excuse themselves from a decedent's valid arbitration
agreement. Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla clearly and expressly intended that Mrs. Bybee's
wrongful death claims be arbitrated and this Court should enforce that agreement.

by non-signatory beneficiaries of deceased employees compelled to arbitrate claims); In
re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1981) (non-signatory transport
company subject to arbitration as an agent of plaintiff); BriarcliffNursing Home, Inc. v.
Turcotte, 894 So.2d 661, 665 (Ala. 2004) (estate of deceased nursing home patient required to arbitrate wrongful death claim); Wilkerson ex rel Estate ofWilkerson v. Nelson,
395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (husband and child of deceased patient required to arbitrate wrongful death claim against hospital); Pelz ex rel Estate of Pelz v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367 F. Supp. 2d 711, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (heirs required to arbitrate wrongful death claims that were based on contractual relationship between decedent
and defendant); County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 47 Cal.
App. 4th 237, 242, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (1996) (nonsignatories required to arbitrate
where "a preexisting relationship existed between the nonsignatory and one of the parties
to the arbitration agreement, making it equitable to compel the nonsignatory to also be
bound to arbitrate his or her claim"); Bolanos v. Khalatian, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1586, 1591,
283 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1991) (spouses, children and heirs of patients who have signed arbitration agreements required to arbitrate medical malpractice claims, especially if the
claims derive from treatment of the signatory patient); NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newton, 84 Cal. App. 4th 64, 72-73, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683 (2000) (same; listing cases); Harris v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 475, 478, 233 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1986) (nonsignatory employees required to arbitrate pursuant to agreements signed by their employers).
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III.

UTAH STATUTES ANTICIPATE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AGAINST THE HEIRS OF MR. BYBEE.

The Utah Arbitration Act anticipates that an arbitration agreement would apply to
a decedent's heirs. This act provides that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing
or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable" except under
certain conditions not found or argued here. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-3; see also Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1981) (nothing prevents
agreement to arbitrate future claims or disputes); Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Assn. of
Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996) ("[tjhe Act supports arbitration of both present
and future disputes").
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also specifically envisions the enforcement
of arbitration agreements against persons other than the patient. The Act contemplates
that all persons claiming damages, not just the patient, will be involved in, and thus
bound by, the arbitration process:
[T]he [arbitration] agreement shall require that
(i)

one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming
damages;

(ii)

one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider;

(iii)

a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming
damages and the health care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of
Utah.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-14-17(l)(b).
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A single patient is typically the only physically injured party in a medical malpractice action. It is clear, therefore, the legislature anticipated that arbitration agreements
would encompass claims for damages other than those brought by the injured patient
such as wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. Other courts have enforced arbitration agreements against the spouse and heirs for wrongful death, see, e.g., Allen v.
Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379, 80 (Colo. 2003) {en banc), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 1212
(2004)) (enforcement denied on other grounds), as well as persons claiming damages for
loss of consortium who were not signatories to the arbitration agreement,

see, e.g.,

Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1998) (spouse's loss of consortium claim
subject to employee's arbitration agreement).
The 2004 amendment to the Act limits the enforceability of arbitration clauses
against persons who are not parties to the contract only to the extent "the sole basis for
the claim is an injury sustained by [the patient]." Given the status of Utah law regarding
the status of a decedent as the "master of his own claim," this amendment is properly
viewed as a clarification or limitation of prior law, not as an expansion of that law. It is
not, as the lower court believed, a question of retroactivity. In considering the amendment as a retroactivity issue, the lower court failed to recognize that so far as applicable
to the facts in this case, the amendment was a reiteration of prior law, not a change to
prior law.
The Arbitration Agreement is valid and binding upon Mrs. Bybee and the district
court erred by refusing to enforce the agreement according to Utah law.
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IV.

PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BECAUSE IT GIVES EFFECT TO THE
PARTIES' INTENT AND AVOIDS PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVACY CONCERNS.

This Court has held that arbitration agreements are favored in Utah. See Allred v.
Educators Mut. Ins. Assn. of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996). In Allred, this
Court unanimously upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a long-term disability policy stating:
The [Arbitration] Act supports arbitration of both present and future disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.
909 P.2d at 1265 (citation omitted).
Other courts have expressed the concern that if an arbitration agreement cannot be
enforced against the heirs or spouse of the patient absent the heir's or spouse's signature,
a patient's privacy is jeopardized because "to authorize an intrusion into a patient's confidential relationship with a physician as the price for guaranteeing a third person, even a
spouse, access to a jury trial on matters arising from the patient's own treatment, poses
problems of a particularly serious nature." Gross v. Recabaren, 206 Cal. App. 3d 771,
782 (1988) (emphasis in original).
The significance of a patient's personal privacy rights with respect to medical matters is accorded special protection by Utah's legislature, see, e.g., UTAH R. EVID. 506,
(physician-patient privilege); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17a-502(10) (prohibiting disclosure
of confidential pharmacy records); § 58-44a-502(l) (prohibiting "disregard for a patient's
dignity or right to privacy as to his person, condition, possessions, or medical records" by
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a nurse-midwife), and the rules promulgated under the recently effective Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") (imposing significant fines,
penalties, and/or jail time for non-compliance with privacy rules). Moreover, Utah courts
have recognized that "a patient has a right of privacy and self determination as regards
his or her own medical care." Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 198 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
The Gross court further explained that
[i]t would appear indisputable that if spouses disagree on any decision regarding the terms of medical treatment, including the desirability of an arbitration provision, the view of only one can prevail. Inasmuch as the patient
is more directly and immediately affected, as between the two, the balance
must weigh in that individual's favor.
Gross, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 782.
For those reasons, this Court should recognize the importance of Mr. Bybee's—
and all patients'—privacy rights and rights of personal determination by enforcing the
Arbitration Agreement as Mr. Bybee intended, in favor of arbitration of all "claims for
personal injury, loss of consortium, [and] wrongful death" asserted by Mrs. Bybee.
(R. 10.)
V.

MRS. BYBEE IS BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY.

Some courts in other jurisdictions which have examined this issue have held that
heirs are bound as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement to arbitrate. Under that
analysis, although Mrs. Bybee did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, she is bound by its
terms as a third-party beneficiary.
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Third-party beneficiaries are those "'recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration.'" Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Utah 1999).
"The existence of third party beneficiary status 'is determined by examining a written
contract.'" Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109 f 11, 62 P.3d 440 (quotation omitted).
Article 1 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla
"expressly intend that this Arbitration Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for
injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered
by [Dr. Abdulla] after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children." (R. 10.) Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla created in Mrs. Bybee an
enforceable right to arbitration. Arbitration was a significant benefit to Mr. Bybee and
Dr. Abdulla as evidenced by their agreement. Among the benefits of arbitration include
the "speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes," Allred v. Educators Mut.
Ins. Assn. of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996), and "giving effect to the intentions
of the parties[ and] easing court congestion," Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636
P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981). As a further benefit, Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla also specifically entered into the Arbitration Agreement intending that "arbitration proceedings"
remain "private, not public," and requiring that the "privacy of the parties and of the arbitration proceedings shall be preserved." (R. 10.) Mrs. Bybee expressly received the right
to enforce arbitration as a third-party beneficiary.
The trial court found that arbitration was not a benefit to Mrs. Bybee because Mrs.
Bybee subjectively did not consider it a benefit and because it deprived her of a choice to
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have a judicial resolution of her dispute. (R. 168.) This analysis, however, is erroneous
because it is immaterial whether the beneficiary desires the benefit since it is the beneficiary who seeks the other benefits of the contractual relationship between the parties.
Mrs. Bybee seeks to recover from Dr. Abdulla based upon his physician-patient relationship and yet Mrs. Bybee desires to avoid the Arbitration Agreement that formed a part of
that relationship. Utah law does not permit the division of a contractual relationship in
this manner. See, e.g., Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3 \ 12, 40
P.3d 599. Hence, Mrs. Bybee may not bring her wrongful death claim based on the physician-client relationship without complying with the arbitration provision of that relationship.
Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla undertook the Arbitration Agreement not only for Dr.
Abdulla's benefit, but also for Mrs. Bybee's and the heirs' direct benefit and affirmatively made this intention clear by naming Mrs. Bybee and Mr. Bybee's heirs in the terms
and language of the agreement. Mrs. Bybee is bound by the terms of the Arbitration
Agreement as third-party beneficiaries and the Court should order arbitration accordingly. See Parsley v. Terminix In? I Co., 1998 WL 1572764 (S.D. Ohio) (arbitration
agreement enforced against third-party beneficiary); Terminix In?I. Co., LP v. Ponzio,
693 So.2d 104 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (same).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Abdulla respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the district court's order refusing to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration
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and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement.
DATED this J ^ day of August, 2006.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

G^<->

Brian P. Miller
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
N \21566\7\BRIEF DOC 8/30/06
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APPENDIX

1.

Arbitration Agreement, May 23, 2003

2.

Decision, April 5, 2006

IN
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

«9

Arh'cle 1: Agreement to Arbitrote? Wc hereby ogree to submit lo binding orbiirolion oil disputes ond cloims for domoges cl ony k.nd
'o« ^,.,00 ond losses orising from Ihe medical core rendered 0» which should hovQ been (indued ofter ihe dole of lh»s Agreement All cloimj for
•noneiory domoges ogoinsl the physician, and ihe physlaon's parinerj. ossociotes, association, corporation or partnership, ond the employees,
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»c ce'ect ony lee from ihe patient ond doing so ihoii nol waive the Physician's righl lo compel orbiirolion of any molprochce clo»m However
:
onow.ng ihe osser'ion of ony malpractice cloim ogoinsl Ihe Physician, ony fee dhpuie, whefher or not ihe subject of ony existing legal cci'on, jncll
c»io be resolved by orbiirolion
/Ve expressly mlend Ihor this Agreement $holl bind ell pe^om whose cloimj for injur»cs ond losses arise ou» ol medico! ; C T 'fr.oc'cc o
~*.cr should nove besn (Q(\d^(ed by Physiaon ollei ihe dote of ftvi Agreemeni. including ony spouse or heirs of ihe poiiam ond ony cn»icien
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.nclvC-ng motions lor summary judgment ond motions to dismiss for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence; odminiver oaths; issue suopoenos
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The poriies ogree that rhe orbiirolion proceedings ore pnvoie. not public, ond the privocy ol ihe parties ond of the orbttro'icn prcceec ngi
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Article 4: Applicable l a w ; With respect to ony manor nol herein expressly p(ow\dQd for, the orbirrolion sholl be governed by ^e j\zr
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
LISA BYBEE,
Plaintiff,

DECISION
vs.

Case Number: 050903397

ALAN ABDULLA, MD and JOHN DOES 15,

Judge Pamela G. Heffernan

Defendants.

UNDISPUTED FACTS:

1. On May 23, 2003, Mark Bybee, deceased husband of plaintiff Lisa Bybee, signed an
Arbitration Agreement with defendant Dr. Alan Abdulla.

2. The Arbitration Agreement provides that the parties would submit to binding arbitration for
"all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical
care rendered or which should have been rendered."

3. The Arbitration Agreement further "bind(s) all persons whose claims for injuries and losses
arise out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered ... including any spouse or
heirs of the patient and any children..."
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4. The Arbitration Agreement also represents that the Agreement was read and understood by
Mr. Bybee and provides that signing the agreement is not a prerequisite to receiving medical
services from the doctor.

5. Lisa Bybee did not sign the agreement.

6. Medical treatment was rendered to Mr. Bybee by Dr. Abdulla.

7. On February 20, 2004, Mr. Bybee committed suicide.

8. Lisa Bybee brings this action alleging that Dr. Abdulla committed medical malpractice in his
treatment of Mr. Bybee and that she is entitled to damages for Mr. Bybee's wrongful death.

DECISION:

The court concludes that the Arbitration Agreement signed by Mr. Bybee purporting to bind
Lisa Bybee, his wife, to the agreement to submit to binding arbitration is not enforceable as to
Lisa Bybee. The reasons for this decision are set forth below.
The threshold question is whether the 2003 version (enacted in 1999) or the 2004 version of
Utah Code Ann. 78-14-17 applies. The applicable change from the 2003 version is that the
legislature specifically added language in 2004 that expanded the individuals to whom an
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Arbitration Agreement would apply. Prior to 2004 the statute at issue referred only to the
applicability of the Agreement to the patient. In 2004 the following language was added:
(vii) the agreement only apply to:
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed,
provided that the agreement may allow a person who would be a proper
party in court to participate in an arbitration proceeding;
(B) the claim of:
(I) a person who signed the agreement;
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under
Subsection (6); and
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection
(l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from the date the agreement is signed;
and
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis
For the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection
(l)(b)(vii)(B)

Plaintiff argues that the 2003 version of the applicable statute is applicable to the instant case
because the claims arose before the 2004 version went into effect. Defendant argues that the
2004 version is applicable and retroactive because the changes made were procedural rather than
substantive.
The court finds it critical to first analyze which version of the statute applies to the instant
case for reasons which will become obvious in the latter portion of this opinion.
At first blush, defendant's argument that the 2004 changes in the statute at issue are
procedural only because it specifies only the forum in which disputes will be decided appears to
have merit. However, upon further analysis, it is clear that it is not simply a procedural change
that was enacted. Rather, the change fundamentally alters the party's substantive right of access
to the courts.
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Generally, a statute cannot be given retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly declares
such an intent in the statute. Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). However, if
the statute changes procedural rather than substantive rights, the new statute will apply to all
cases including those which have accrued or are pending actions. Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450,
455 (Utah 1983). This court is directed, however, to narrowly construe what is defined as
procedural for the purpose of retroactive application of a statute. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre
Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257,261 (Utah 1998).
Defendant's position that the statute's change is procedural only is in direct conflict with
precedent. In Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court clearly
states that the right to apply to the courts for relief from a perpetrated wrong is a substantive
right. Justice Stewart in Jenkins states the following:
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantees that courts shall be open and that
every injured person shall have a remedy by due course of law. Even the most limited
reading of this provision guarantees a day in court to all parties with potential liability...

Justice Stewart goes on to state that binding someone who is not a party to an arbitration
agreement to submit to arbitration would be depriving them of "this substantive right." Id- at 799.
Because the change in the 2004 amendment is substantive rather than procedural, the court
finds that it is not retroactive to a claim that allegedly arises before its enactment, specifically this
case. Therefore, defendant cannot rely on the 2004 amendment to require Mrs. Bybee to submit
her claim to binding arbitration.
Defendant also argues that even if the 2004 changes to the statute are not retroactive, the
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Arbitration Agreement is binding on plaintiff because the Agreement signed by Mr. Bybee
explicitly binds her to arbitrate. Assuming for purposes of this decision that the claims asserted
by Mrs. Bybee fall within the ambit of those to which the Agreement refers, the next question is
whether such an agreement is binding as to Mrs. Bybee under the applicable state law governing
contracts. (This court recognizes that the legislature may change common law by statute which it
apparently did in the 2004 changes to the applicable statute; however, given the decision that the
2004 amendments relating to binding of spouses are not retroactive, the court is bound to resort to
an analysis of the applicable common law).
It is a fundamental tenet of contract law that a contract is enforceable only between the parties
to the contract. Wagner v. Clifton. 62 P.3d 440. 442 (Utah 2002). That rule of contract law is
applicable to arbitration agreements. See Cade v. Zions First National Bank. 986 P.2d 1073
(Utah App. 1998). In McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah. 20 P.3d 901 (2001) Justice
Durrant elaborates on this principal and states the law as follows:
Because parties to a binding arbitration waive substantial rights to formal public
adjudication of their disputes, the Act demands, as a minimum threshold for its
enforcement, direct and specific evidence of an agreement between the parties. Id. at 17.

It is clear from the face of the Arbitration Agreement that plaintiff Mrs. Bybee did not sign
the Agreement and there is no evidence that she otherwise agreed to be bound by the Arbitration
Agreement. However, she still may be bound under the common law if she is deemed to be a
third party beneficiary of the Agreement or if it can be concluded that Mr. Bybee was acting as her
agent when he signed the Agreement. The defense urges the court to find both of these
propositions to be true in this case. The court finds, however, that neither of these exceptions is
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applicable to the instant case.
First, a third party beneficiary is one who has enforceable rights pursuant to a contract
to which they aren't parties and haven't tendered any consideration. Rio Algom Corp. V.
Jimco. Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980). In addition, the contract must make clear an
intention to confer a "separate and distinct benefit upon the third party." Wagner v.
Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 441-442 (Utah 2002).
It is fundamental that the beneficiary receive a benefit. The defense argues that Mrs.
Bybee receives the benefit of having the right to require the defendant doctor to arbitrate
her claim rather than having the case decided in court. They argue that arbitration is a
more beneficial way to resolve legal disputes because it is speedier, less expensive and
more private. That position ignores the possibility that if Mrs. Bybee does not wish to
arbitrate but rather sees it to her benefit to proceed with her claim in court, the agreement
deprives her of the substantial benefit of having that option. Enforcement of the
Arbitration Agreement as to her would effectively deprive her of her "substantial right to
judicial resolution of (her) dispute." McCoy supra at 15. It defies common sense to
claim that Mrs. Bybee is a third party beneficiary to an agreement when the option she
wishes to exercise, i.e., having her claim adjudicated in court, has been terminated by that
agreement if it is enforced. Had the Arbitration Agreement provided the spouse the
option of electing either arbitration or judicial resolution as to claims that
the patient could not have brought such as in the instant case, wrongful death, then
arguably she would have received a distinct and separate benefit of the agreement.
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The second exception urged upon the court by the defense is that a husband may bind
his wife to an Arbitration Agreement by virtue of their spousal relationship. Essentially,
the argument is that Mr. Bybee acted as his wife's agent in agreeing to bind her to the
Arbitration Agreement. They cite to the statutory provisions that provide for joint and
several liability of a husband and wife for expenses of the family (Utah Code Ann. 30-29). They also cite to Utah Code Ann. 30-2-8 which provides that either a husband or wife
may appoint the other as their attorney subject to the right to revoke that appointment just
as any other person would have.
As to the family expense doctrine, if this case involved an action by the doctor to
recover for medical expenses incurred by Mr. Bybee, Utah Code Ami. 30-2-9 may apply
and a good argument could probably be made that Mrs. Bybee should be required to
arbitrate those claims. Effectively she would step into the shoes of Mr. Bybee and
probably should be required to submit to the limitations agreed to by Mr. Bybee on how
the matter of a debt should be resolved.. That is obviously not the issue here.
As to Utah Code Ann. 30-2-8, there is simply no evidence that Mrs. Bybee gave Mr.
Bybee any power of attorney to enter into a contract with the defendant to which she
would be bound. The more applicable section that establishes Mrs. Bybee's independent
right to enter into contracts is found in Utah Code Ann. 30-2-2. That statute codifies the
elimination of the common law restriction on a woman's right to contract. Utah Code
Ann. 30-2-4 also makes clear that a woman may bring legal action separate from her
husband and may "recover against a third person for such injury or wrong as if
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unmarried..." Id.
The defense also cites as authority for the proposition that Mr. Bybee could bind Mrs.
Bybee to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement the statute which provides that a spouse
may consent to health care for their spouse. Utah Code Ann. 78-14-5 (4)(b). The
authorization for a spouse to consent to health care for another spouse has been limited to
situations where the spouse in need of health care and is not capable of giving their own
consent. It does not stand for the proposition that a husband may bind his wife to a
contract to which she is not a party, has not agreed to, and which contract does not
represent a family type of expense.
The case of Jenkins v. Percival et al„ 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998) is instructive although
the facts of that case are substantially different from those in the instant case. In Jenkins,
supra, the plaintiff sought to enforce an oral agreement to arbitrate her personal injury
claim against defendant Gerald Percival, Plaintiff alleged that her counsel and PercivaPs
insurance adjuster entered into an oral agreement to arbitrate her claim after settling the
personal injury claims of Jenkins' children. All the claims arose out of the same accident.
Percival resisted the attempt to require him to arbitrate arguing that the arbitration may
expose him to liability in excess of his policy limit. Percival further argued that the
insurance adjuster lacked authority to waive his right of access to the courts. Although
Jenkins, supra, addresses the issue of an arbitration agreement in the context of an
insured's potential exposure to liability beyond his policy limits, Justice Stewart's
reasoning and statements in that decision make it clear that absent a voluntary and
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intelligent waiver by one holding a legal claim, access to the court shall be preserved for
all injured persons. Jenkins, supra at 799. Specifically Justice Stewart stated that:
The insurance contract between the insurance company and the insured does not
authorize the adjuster to waive the individual rights of the insured. "The right to
apply to the courts for relief for the perpetration of a wrong is a substantial right"
and cannot be waived through contract except "in the most unequivocal terms."
(quoting from Bracken v. Dahle, 251 P. 16, 20 (1926) As a result, the adjuster
cannot unilaterally bind the insured to arbitration. Supra.
In the instant case there is no factual or legal basis to allow Mr. Bybee to unilaterally bind
Mrs. Bybee to an Agreement to Arbitrate. There is no evidence of an agency relationship either
by agreement or by law.
Because the court has decided the issues as set forth above, it is unnecessary to address the
issues of whether the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable or whether federal preemption is
applicable.

DATED this _5_

day of/Mojs/

, 2006.

District Court Judge
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